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The economic analysis of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) has largely focused so far on how they affect the level of trade distortions. On that count, the verdict is still out: whereas early political economists held a dim view of their benefits (e.g. Grossman and Helpman 1995 showed that politically feasible RTAs were the most trade-diverting), recent papers (e.g. Ornelas 2005) have taken a more nuanced view, showing that RTAs can release trade-liberalizing forces.
However, as noted by Braumoeller (2006) , institutional arrangements like RTAs can equally importantly affect the volatility of trade policy, and that aspect has been largely overlooked (with a few notable exceptions discussed below). We explore empirically here whether RTAs have reduced the volatility of barriers to agricultural trade, using the World Bank's new database on agricultural distortions (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008) .
The issue of whether regionalism has dampened agricultural trade-policy volatility is an important one. Volatility in food prices is more likely to trigger riots than volatility in the price of, say, shirts or home appliances. Indeed, Anderson (2009, Ch. 1) shows that border measures have been used systematically by Asian countries to dampen the volatility of the world price of rice, a particularly sensitive commodity in that region. If changes in the level of border measures were used only to insulate domestic markets against terms-of-trade volatility, they could be justified on insurance grounds (Rodrik 1998). But they are also likely to have an " autonomous" , discretionary component driven by the vagaries of local political processes. This discretionary policy volatility is likely to be welfare-reducing, because the welfare costs of distortions rise with the square of the wedge between domestic and world prices. It may also harm investment and growth if it creates an atmosphere of policy uncertainty (Sudsawasad and Moore 2006) . If
RTAs have the effect of reducing it through a commitment effect (whether based on rules-vsdiscretion or strategic delegation), this is an important " non-traditional" argument in their favor, using the terminology of Fernandez and Portes (1998) .
Whether policy volatility is reduced by international institutions has been explored empirically in two recent papers: Rose (2004) on the WTO and Mansfield and Reinhardt (2008) on RTAs. Both papers use the volatility of trade flows (rather than policy) as the variable of interest, and are based on variants of the gravity equation. Rose (2004) starts from the observation that one of the stated goals of the multilateral trading system is to enhance the stability and predictability of the environment in which traders operate. The WTO's web site, for instance, states that "just as important as freer trade --perhaps more important --are other principles of the WTO system. For example: non-discrimination, and making sure the conditions for trade are stable, predictable and transparent."
1 There are many mechanisms through which WTO rules could make the policy environment of WTO members more stable. For instance, binding tariffs reduces the scope for manipulating them. However, tariffs have been bound by developing countries at levels substantially above those applied:
China bound its tariffs on imported agricultural goods at an average level of 16.5 percent even though the Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) that it applied at the time of its accession was on period averages of standard gravity regressors as well as two binary variables marking WTO membership of the importer and exporter. The exercise can be thought of as a treatment-effect estimation with a treatment of variable intensity (zero, one or two countries in the pair being "treated" by WTO membership). Using a variety of specifications (importer and exporter fixed effects, country-pair fixed effects, and so on), Rose consistently finds that WTO membership fails to reduce the volatility of trade flows, concluding that the multilateral trading system's disciplines are simply not strong enough to have a statistically traceable effect. (Abbott 2000, p. 519) . Precision, obligation and delegation should all contribute to reducing discretionary policy volatility. Indeed, Abbott notes that "in regard to NAFTA, Canada insisted on adding precision to rules of origin and transformation with respect to automobiles and parts, because imprecise rules of CUSFTA had been interpreted by the United States to the detriment of Japanese investors in Canada. This U.S. interpretation created substantial uncertainty among prospective Japanese investors" (Abbott 2000, p. 528) .
It is even more difficult to assess empirically the ability of RTAs to reduce discretionary policy volatility than in the case of WTO membership, because RTAs are diverse in nature and their effects can be asymmetric across their own member states. As to heterogeneity, Abbott shows in his detailed comparison of NAFTA and the European Union that the EU relied heavily on delegation to supra-national institutions (the European Commission and the European Court of Justice) to give substance to an initial text (the Treaty of Rome) that was imprecise. By contrast, NAFTA relies very little on delegation to supra-national institutions, except in the areas of investment (where private agents can challenge the governments of partner countries at the World Bank's arbitration court, the ICSID) and anti-dumping. The reason for the EU's heavy reliance on delegation is that it was, at the outset, a political project meant to lead to political integration, whereas NAFTA never had that goal and the U.S. Congress would have resisted any infringement on its sovereignty in legislative matters. However, the NAFTA treaty is very precise in its wording by the standards of preferential trade agreements. Thus the commitment mechanisms of NAFTA and the EU are different: rules vs. discretion for the former, delegation for the latter.
As to asymmetry in the effects of RTAs, taking again the example of NAFTA, even though Article VI of the U.S. Constitution states that treaties are the supreme law of the land, the U.S. Congress "expressly denied the possibility of domestic direct effect for NAFTA in the legislation approving and implementing the agreement, and it may not be relied on as a source of rights in U.S. law" (Abbott 2000, p. 538) . Thus NAFTA cannot be invoked directly by an importer to challenge a Customs decision; the legal basis of the challenge must be U.S. domestic law (presumably put in accordance with the NAFTA treaty though). By contrast, under the Mexican Constitution, the NAFTA Treaty has force of law and can be invoked directly in courts.
This stronger commitment no doubt reflects the Mexican government's desire to use NAFTA to improve the country's image in terms of legal stability in order to encourage foreign direct investment. According to Whalley (1998) , Mexican negotiators were mainly concerned with locking in domestic policy reforms rather than a bilateral exchange of concessions during NAFTA negotiations.
These two examples highlight both the potential for RTAs to act as commitment mechanisms (suggesting there should be an effect to look for) and the potential heterogeneity of their effect on domestic policy volatility (suggesting that the effect may be difficult to identify). Like Mansfield and Reinhardt, we find that RTAs are robustly associated with a decrease in agricultural trade-policy volatility across a variety of specifications. But we find that the effect of WTO membership is less precisely estimated, sometimes being insignificant, which seems to go some way toward reconciling their results with Rose's. Thus, as far as we can tell from our empirical experiment, in this particular instance the multilateral trading system and regional agreements work in the same direction, but the disciplines of the latter seem more readily identifiable than those of the former.
Estimation
Let c denote a country, t denote time, ct σ be the volatility of 's trade policy in year t , and be a summary measure of the incidence of RTAs for country c in year t . The construction of and is discussed in the data section below. Let also be a dummy variable marking WTO membership, a vector of controls (whose composition is also discussed in the data section), and time and country fixed effects, and 
where all continuous variables (including σ ) are log linearized.
Because RTAs may be formed precisely in response to excessive trade-policy volatility, OLS estimates of (1) will be biased downwards. We accordingly instrument with a vector of instruments and estimate (1) by 2SLS and efficient two-stage GMM.
The existing theoretical literature on the determinants of trade agreements offers some guidance in finding valid instruments. First, large countries may want to sign trade agreements in order to overcome prisoner's dilemma situations where they unilaterally set tariffs too high because of terms-of-trade externalities. Moreover, the larger is a country, the larger is the interest other countries have in securing access to that particular market. 2 In contrast, smaller countries may not be large enough to influence world prices or attract the interest of other countries.
Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between the economic size of a country, measured by the level of its GDP, and its involvement in regionalism (the endogenous right-hand-side variable).
Second, Maggi and Rodrguez-Clare (1998) argue that governments with weak bargaining positions vis-à-vis interest groups are more likely to want to precommit because weak bargaining positions reduce the rents that they derive from the political game. This suggests using domestic political institutions, a standard approach to instrumenting policy variables (see Besley and Case 2000 for a discussion). Maggi and Rodrguez-Clare also suggest that governments that are neither too sensitive, nor too impervious, to interest-group pressures are more likely to sign trade agreements. The argument is that a government that is too sensitive would not want to precommit for fear of losing the lobbies' contributions, while one that puts a large weight on social welfare would not need to precommit. To capture these non-linearities, we include in the list of instruments the square of a measure of governments' weight on social welfare, taken from 2 This is nothing but Fernandez' `insurance'' motive for the large country's partners. The argument gave rise to a lively debate on Dani Rodrik's blog. Commenting on Senator Clinton's proposal to submit trade agreements like NAFTA to five-year reviews, political scientist Dan Drezner wrote:
``Her campaign website proudly declares that as president, Clinton would restore America's standing in the world. Last week, however, she proposed that we reassess our trade agreements every five years and demand adjustments to them if necessary, starting with NAFTA.
``This proposal makes me wonder if Senator Clinton understands the value-added of these free-trade agreements, or FTAs. The dirty secret is that most FTAs do not have large effects on the American economy, but they do yield foreign policy dividends. These agreements cement ties with key allies. They offer a guarantee to these countries that their relationship with the United States --and their access to American consumers --will not be disrupted. Compare the unease and mistrust that characterized Mexican-American relations prior to NAFTA with the past 15 years. The effect can be dramatic.
``In short, trade agreements improve America's standing in the world. But Senator Clinton's proposal would strip these agreements of the very certainty that makes them attractive to our allies. How does Senator Clinton think our trading partners in the Middle East, Central America, and Pacific Rim will react to her proposal? How is this proposal any different from the unilateralism that Democrats have condemned for the past six years?'' (comment posted on October 18, 2007).
Grossman and Helpman's common-agency model. Similarly, the European Union offers special preferential treatment to countries cooperating on "Singapore" and environmental issues under its GSP-plus.
3 Regional agreements can also reflect security concerns. This was certainly the case of Europe's Common Market, which was set up to reduce Franco-German tensions. Security concerns in the face of threats of Communist subversion have also been historical drivers of ASEAN. To proxy such security concerns, we use the number of military alliances to which each country belongs in a given year.
We use under-, over-and weak-identification tests to assess the suitability of our instruments. All specifications control for heteroskedasticity and first-order autocorrelation in the error term, and in a robustness section we also control for the lagged level of trade distortions, conjecturing that the volatility of trade barriers may somehow be proportional to their level. The distribution of NRAs shows large variation across and within goods and countries.
Dependent variable data
By and large, NRAs have been rising in high-income countries since the mid-1950s (the beginning of the database) with the exception of Australia and New Zealand. In developing countries, NRAs have also been rising, with export taxes rising between the 1950s and the 1980s and receding thereafter, and import taxes rising monotonically. Whether for export or importcompeting goods, variations around the trend remain large over time. Clearly, trade policy volatility is a common characteristic of both high-income and developing countries.
We measure the volatility of NRAs in two steps: First, we take the absolute value of first differences in Anderson and Valenzuela's measure of the price wedge, product by product; next, we take the simple average of those absolute values across all goods in a given country and year.
That is,
Defining variability this way allows us to minimize the loss of observations in the time dimension. 4 In order to reduce the influence of outliers, we put ct σ and all volatility variables in logs.
Independent variable data
The first regressor of interest is . Alternative measures include the square of the first differences (instead of the absolute value) or the variance calculated over blocs of years. This last approach however entails a substantial loss of observations, which would reduce our ability to estimate the autocorrelation parameter in the error term. The PID's classification of political regimes can be considered too coarse. For instance, Olper and Raimondi (2010) show that autocracies and democracies behave differently in shaping agricultural policy. As a sensitivity check, we set autocracies apart and differentiated between presidential, assembly-elected and parliamentary systems only for
We turn now to the construction of the weight on social welfare, . 
where is the tariff on good i in year t ; is an indicator function equal to one if sector is politically organized in year ; is domestic production of good i in year t ; are imports of good i in year ; is the import demand elasticity of good i in year t ; 
where are imports (exports) of good i in year and is the import demand elasticity it m t it e democracies. We also decoupled presidential, assembly-elected and parliamentary democracies into majoritarian and proportional systems and distinguished them, again, from autocracies. Whichever definition of institutions we use, the incidence of trade agreements and of the multilateral trading system on agricultural trade policy volatility remains robust.
6
In doing so we abuse the model somewhat, as Grossman and Helpman's (GH) model did not include any bindings or commitment mechanism. What follows should of course not be constructed as a test of GH, but rather as a shortcut to proxy the vulnerability of governments to capture by special interests, a crucial element of any politicaleconomy analysis of trade protection.
7
The database includes a large proportion of negative , in particular in its early years (roughly up to the 1980s). As the data in Anderson (2009) Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for all variables. For dummy variables, the mean is simply the proportion of countries/years for which the variable is equal to one, i.e. the incidence of the variable in question.
Results
We begin by discussing the baseline results, and then examine their robustness before turning to asses whether Latin America is different from other parts of the world.
Baseline results
Estimation results of the basic specification are shown in Table 2 . The first column shows OLS results, while the second and third column gives 2SLS and GMM results. In each case, standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
As expected, OLS estimates are biased downward and the bias is sizable, suggesting that, as conjectured, countries enter RTAs at least partly to overcome excess trade-policy volatility.
Whatever the estimation method, significantly reduces agricultural trade policy volatility.
The point estimates of the coefficient on the count of trade agreements are very close under 2SLS and GMM (-0.140 and -0.122, respectively). That is, consistent estimation of the basic specification indicates that an additional trade agreement reduces agricultural trade-policy volatility by 12-14 percent (recall that our specification is a semi-log one). Except for macro shocks, controls behave as expected. World price volatility is significant, justifying the adjustment to purge the volatility of agricultural trade policy of its non-discretionary component. The weight government puts on social welfare seems to be an important factor in explaining the dependent variable, as it statistically decreases volatility.
While the effect of assembly-elected systems does not differ statistically from the one of parliamentary regimes, presidential systems, as conjectured, reduce volatility compared with parliamentary regimes. 
Robustness
This section presents the results of two types of robustness checks, each including robust standard errors. The first type consists in using again the basic specification, but controlling for the lagged level of assistance. In a model where changing trade policy implies political and economic adjustment costs (say a partial-adjustment model), the initial level of assistance will be a determinant of changes in trade policy. Also, one may assert that the relevant measure of trade policy volatility is not the percentage-point change in the rate of assistance, but rather the proportional change in the rate of assistance. Controlling for the lagged level of assistance addresses these concerns. Results of OLS, 2SLS and GMM estimates are provided in Table 4 .
Results of the first stage estimation are available upon request. With the exception of the world price volatility in the second stage, the results are qualitatively the same to those reported in Tables 2 and 3 . Adding the initial level of assistance causes the world price volatility coefficient to become insignificant. Also, the lagged level of assistance is statistically significant in the second stage, while negative and statistically insignificant in the first stage. Table 5 be it ). Note that these coefficients are not directly comparable with those of the baseline specification, since the regressor of interest now counts partners, rather than agreements (so the marginal effect is that of a partner country rather than that of an agreem which means that the effect should be expected to be smaller). The number of partners alone does not seem to have any effect. This largely accords with intuition: rules-vs-discretion effec are more likely to be present when a developing country with relatively weak institutions teams up with an industrial one having stronger institutions. The developing country can then "borrow the credibility" of the industrial one, pretty much like countries with weak inflation-fighting records in Europe borrowed the Bundesbank's credibility under the European Monetary Syste is it Chile or Brazil, and what can explain these differences? Table 7 provides the results of the estimation where we added several additional variables that interact TA with country dummies for Latin American countries. found no effect whatsoever, whereas we find a weakly significant but nevertheless identifiable volatility-reducing effect. One obvious difference between our exercise and Rose's is that we look at short-run volatility whereas he looks at the long run. Perhaps more importantly, in our We also find that deeper agree have more volatility-reducing effects. This accords with intuition. If the reduction in volatility is obtained by strategic delegation to supra-national institutions, those are likely to b stronger if they are formed, like the EU, by countries with strong domestic institutions. Put crudely, Bulgaria is likely to get a stronger anchor for its trade policy by joining the EU than forming an RTA with Romania, for example. If the reduction in volatility is obtained instead by substituting rules for discretion in an RTA with precise rules (like NAFTA), those rules will be stronger if they are backed by a country with strong and stable institutions. This is like countries with weak institutions (e.g. weak separation of powers) "borrowing" the credibility of countries with stronger institutions.
Results for Latin A inant, confirm the overall picture. They suggest that the trade policy volatility-reduc effect of regional integration agreements has on average been stronger in this region, although there is some interesting heterogeneity within the region.
Thus, by and large our results suggest that the redu as one of the "non-traditional" gains from regionalism. Inasmuch as policy volatility h harmful effects for investment and growth, this may be an important argument in support of regionalism. 
